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ABSTRACT
Around half a million cycle rickshaws are currently active in Dhaka,
Bangladesh. With only 86,000 oﬃcial licenses available, diﬀerent
types of organizations supply licenses to most rickshaw drivers.
These non-oﬃcial licenses mimic the language of the state. This
article argues that while these licenses appear as part of non-
state, hybrid, or twilight institutions, they in fact constitute a state
practice. Based on approximately 200 semi-structured interviews
at six locations in Dhaka and oﬀering a conceptualization of the
Bangladesh state as a party-state, the article shows that the
operation of non-oﬃcial rickshaw licenses and the mimicry
entailed is an inherent part of party-state governance, one which
is not morally neutral. While most respondents saw the everyday
beneﬁts of non-oﬃcial licenses in the absence of suﬃcient oﬃcial
ones, the latter remained the most prized and, if made available,
respondents agreed that the former would become redundant.
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Introduction
About 400,000–500,0001 cycle rickshaws currently ply the roads of Dhaka, the capital of
Bangladesh. To regulate this transportation sector the municipal corporation issued
86,000 licenses in 1986. Since then, no more oﬃcial licenses have been issued. Yet,
almost all rickshaws carry a license of sorts. Most of these are supplied by a number of
associations. This article focuses on these non-oﬃcial rickshaw licenses, the associations
which issue them, and the way these are related to state regulation. While it is tempting
to consider these non-oﬃcial licenses as an example of the mimicry of the language of
the state by non-state public authorities (potentially leading to a hybrid state/non-state
arrangement) this article, by providing a conceptualization of the operation of the Bangla-
desh state, argues that these non-oﬃcial licenses and the mimicry entailed in fact consti-
tute a state practice.
I thus have two related aims: ﬁrst, I provide insight into the regulation of one of the
most important forms of public transport in Dhaka and second, and on a more theoretical
level, I inquire whether a focus on hybridity forecloses a more profound reﬂection on the
nature of the state in which mimicry can appear as a state practice.
© 2018 BCAS, Inc.
CONTACT Bert Suykens bert.suykens@ugent.be Department of Conﬂict & Development Studies, Ghent University,
Universiteitstraat 8, 9000 Ghent, Belgium
1Estimates range from 300,000 to 700,000. Some newspaper reports put the ﬁgure at one million. See Ali 2016.
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The article is based on around 200 semi-structured interviews conducted in six neigh-
borhoods of Dhaka (see Figure 1). These neighborhoods were selected because of the high
Figure 1. Map of Dhaka City with research locations: Badda/Rampura, Demra, Kamrangichar, Moham-
madpur, Shahjadpur, and Uttara. CREDIT: Map data ©2016Google.
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density of rickshaw garages. These oﬀered direct access to rickshaw owners, drivers, garage
personnel such as managers and mechanics, and license brokers. The study was conducted
in two phases. In November 2012, I conducted a pilot study on rickshaw garages and
licenses. In March and April 2015 the bulk of the interviews were conducted, in collabor-
ation with the Micro-Governance Research Initiative (MGR), Dhaka University. Seven
Dhaka University social science students conducted approximately thirty interviews
each, based on an interview protocol, in appointed neighborhoods. If respondents gave
consent, the interview was recorded and later transcribed. In a few cases, ﬁeld notes
were taken and transcribed. The research material of one interviewer (focusing on
Mirpur) was rejected from the study because of questions about research ethics and val-
idity of the ﬁndings.
After providing a theoretical background to the argument and a general background to
the rickshaw (license) system in Dhaka, I describe and analyze the mimicry involved in
non-oﬃcial license production. Following this, I propose a conception of the Bangladesh
state as a party-state and show that this mimicry should be understood as a state practice.
The mimicry of (the language of) the state
Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat have pointed to the “languages of stateness” or
“the language of the state” as “a bundle of widespread and globalized registers of govern-
ance and authority” to understand the conﬁguration of actual states. These consist of
“practical languages of governance” (such as managing populations, census taking, and
licensing certain economies) and “symbolic languages of authority.” A focus on the
latter language of the state demands, as they argue, a close attention to “how the state
tries to make itself real and tangible through symbols, texts, and iconography.”2 Their
focus on the language of the state has been used extensively, often in relation to
another edited volume about the margins of the state edited by Veena Das and
Deboray Poole.3 While these volumes aim to describe how state authority is produced,
many authors working in this vein have focused on the challenge to look at “stateness”
beyond the state by focusing on non-state actors. I distinguish between three inter-
related sub-sets of literature: non-state authority, hybrid authority, and mimicry.
For the ﬁrst set of literature, Christian Lund has drawn attention to “local authorities
making decisions of a public nature, but in contrast to the state” while deploying its
language.4 In a similar way, Stacey Hunt has deployed languages of stateness to explore
the emergence of shadow states in “el pueblo” in Columbia, in the vacuum left by the
oﬃcial state.5 Lars Buur’s focus on vigilantes’ complex relation to the state – at the
same time being “constituted outside the state” while maintaining an “intimate relation
to the state”6 – is central to many discussions of stateness by non-state actors. In
debates centering on “rebel governance” for instance,7 (material) symbols of state
2Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 5.
3Das and Poole 2004.
4Lund 2006, 687; see also Ranganathan 2014; Stel 2016.
5Hunt 2006.
6Buur 2006, 735; see also Pratten 2006.
7Arjona, Mampilly and Kasﬁr 2015.
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authority, including currency,8 stamps,9 and military cemeteries10 have been crucial in the
symbolic politics of the quintessential outside of the state: the rebel, sometimes giving rise
to proto-states.11 What these studies share is a focus on terms like contrast, vacuum, and
“outside” in relation to the state.
While in the above-mentioned literature state and non-state actors remain discreet
entities, the languages of stateness have also been considered by researchers who try to
understand how state and non-state actors more closely integrate to form hybrid authority
structures.12 This literature has shown the way “public goods such as security, regulation,
and revenue are thus co-produced by a broad range of state and non-state actors and prac-
tices.”13 It highlights the constant “negotiation, secret complicity, and/or open cooperation
between non-state and state actors in forging governance.” These scholars take up the
“languages of stateness” speciﬁcally to understand how non-state authorities may
become state-like “through rituals, performances, and the appropriation” of these
languages, while maintaining the crucial entanglement between state and non-state
spheres of authority.14 While these scholars focus on integration between the two ﬁelds,
they remain interested in how something outside the state can forge relations with a
state, albeit a de-essentialized15 or de-centered16 one.
A third strand of literature, and one with which this paper shares an important connec-
tion, focuses on mimicry, drawing (often implicitly) on Homi Bhabha’s fundamental
insight about the ambivalence and diﬀerence entailed in mimicry as “almost the same,
but not quite.”17 The notion of mimicry has been predominantly used to understand
the symbolic politics of non-state actors. Niklas Foxeus, for instance, shows how Buddhist
“secretive esoteric congregations” in Myanmar mimic crucial state symbols, like the pre-
modern royal palace, the hoisting of ﬂags, and king-like statues18 depicting the congrega-
tion’s founder, to appropriate state forms of power against military rule.19 Similarly, a
recent World Bank report on local justice systems in the Solomon Islands argues that
the “mimicry of state forms” entails an eﬀort to facilitate an “engagement with state
actors” by making “local systems […] legible” to the state and other external actors.20
While not always explicitly theorized as using a Bhabhian framework per se, the groups
and authorities appropriating state symbols discussed in the non-state and hybrid auth-
ority literature can be conceptualized as engaged in acts of mimicry, allowing non-state
8Podder 2014.
9Förster 2015.
10Mampilly 2015.
11Raeymaekers 2013.
12Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot 2008; Meagher, De Herdt and Titeca 2014; for an overview see Hoﬀmann and
Kirk 2013.
13Hagmann and Stepputat 2016, 26.
14Telle and Kingsley 2016, 173.
15Fisher and Timmer 2013, 153.
16Hoﬀman and Kirk 2013, 13.
17Bhabha 1984. While Bhabha is an inspiration for my use of mimicry (in the sense of almost the same, but not quite), I do
not want to overstate the Bhabhaian nature of my argument. I am skeptical of overextending Bhabha’s framework as it
was explicitly developed to understand colonial subject-formation, including a psycho-analytical frame of reference.
While this could be considered a type of governance (in a bio-political sense), simply extending his framework to
other governance domains is not feasible. My use of Bhabha as an inspiration is similar to his use by Klem and Maunaguru
2017 to look at sovereignty or by McConnel, Moreau, and Dittmer 2012 to look at diplomacy.
18For a short discussion of Bhabha in a hybrid authority context, see Petersen 2012.
19Foxeus 2016.
20Allen, Dinnen, Evans, and Monson 2013, 71; for a critique see Oppermann 2015.
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actors to use familiar repertoires to legitimize their rule, but at the same time reifying the
state as providing a “master code.”21
In this case study of non-oﬃcial rickshaw licensing in Bangladesh, the license plates
being “almost the same, but not quite” is exactly what makes them valuable as a tool of
party-state governance. If the non-oﬃcial plates would just replicate exactly the oﬃcial
plates, as duplicates do, this would directly implicate the state (for instance, by suggesting
state corruption). In contrast to the literature discussed above, where the outside of the
state is a central focus of attention, in this case mimicry allows the party-state (see
below) to act as if there is such an outside.22 It is mimicry which makes it appear as if
the non-oﬃcial plates – and the organizations that supply them – fall outside the
control of the state. While mimicry has been used in the literature to show how non-
state actors can appropriate some of the state’s symbolic power, often as a critique of
the state, this case draws attention to the way in which the state itself beneﬁts from
mimicry. While at ﬁrst the non-oﬃcial rickshaw permits might appear to be mimicking
state forms in order to buttress their authority by referring to a master code, they in
the end turn out to be nothing more than an internal aspect of party-state rule. The
only time when the double vision of mimicry is revealed in some way is when moral judg-
ments are made on the functioning of the party-state through a criticism of the mimicry
entailed in the non-oﬃcial plates (see below).
Relating this argument back to the non-state and hybrid authority literature discussed
above, while it is tempting to see the non-oﬃcial rickshaw licenses as outcomes of “twilight
institutions”23 or part of a “hybrid state,”24 a focus on contrast or hybridity blurs the fun-
damental inclusion of this type of non-oﬃcial practices in the functioning of the Bangla-
desh state. A focus on hybridity would present these licenses as an outside domain which
gets entangled with the “formal bureaucratic state.”25 Like the vigilante groups in South
Africa’s Port Elizabeth discussed by Lars Buur,26 the license providing organizations
would appear to be a force independent of the state and later integrated in its operation.
I argue that these non-oﬃcial practices can only be understood as fully internal to the
organization of the Bangladesh state, from their beginning. They only can exist because
of state sanction and should not be simply considered to be ﬁlling a void, but as emerging
from a particular type of state governance. Because they have never been an outside
domain, they cannot be integrated in the operation of the state. As I will show below,
mimicry here is a state practice.
Before I turn to an overview of the rickshaw license system in Dhaka it is important to
reﬂect on terminology. In this article, I use the term “non-oﬃcial” to designate licenses
issued by organizations other than the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) or Union Coun-
cils.27 I avoid employing terms such as “informal” or “illegal” because these suggest a
lack of regulation by the state. While these licenses are not issued by the oﬃcial
21Mbembe 2001, 103; see e.g. Hoﬀmann, Vlassenroot and Marchais 2016, 1436.
22For the inspiration for acting “as if,” see Wedeen 1998; Mitchell 1991.
23Lund 2006, 687.
24Jaﬀe 2013, 735.
25Ibid., 735.
26Buur 2006.
27Union councils, also known as union parishads, are the smallest administrative governance unit in Bangladesh. Each
council has one chair and twelve members, three of whom must be women. There are currently 4554 councils in
Bangladesh.
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bureaucracy (the DCC or the Union Councils), they nevertheless are part of the state’s
regulatory order. The holders of these unoﬃcial licenses are not simply permitted to func-
tion, or allowed to operate in the face of state weakness; they are fully dependent on state
patronage. My choice for non-oﬃcial is thus reminiscent of Ananya Roy’s concerns with
deregulation.28 Roy posits the very process of deregulation – in contrast to “unregula-
tion”29 – as a form of state regulation:
Deregulation indicates a calculated informality, one that involves purposive action and plan-
ning, and one where the seeming withdrawal of regulatory power creates a logic of resource
allocation, accumulation, and authority.30
It is the latter logic which also plays a central role in the operation of the non-ofﬁcial
permits. This type of non-ofﬁcial regulation allows the party-state leadership to direct
resource allocation, in the case of the party-state through party networks, at the same
time strengthening state control and party networks where accumulation takes place.
This is important certainly given that international pressure to reduce the number of rick-
shaws on the streets of Dhaka makes the policy option of regularization unfeasible.31
The rickshaw (license) system in Dhaka
Around half a million rickshaws ply the streets of Dhaka. Ownership is mostly in the hands
of medium-size to large owners. Most owners in our sample own between thirty and seventy
rickshaws, with some owning more than 200. These were either people who inherited their
business or were investors. A much smaller group of owner-drivers either owned a single
rickshaw or had acquired a small number of rickshaws that they rented out. Rickshaws
were stored at rickshaw garages, often controlled by large rickshaw owners who allowed
storage for a small fee. Most rickshaw drivers were recent migrants looking for employment,
sometimes on a seasonal basis. Given their (functional) landlessness, renting a rickshaw pro-
vided an alternative to scarce manual agricultural labor. Rickshaws are often rented out in
two or three shifts (of ﬁve to six hours each) at between Tk80 and Tk120 (approximately US
$1.00 and US$1.50).32 According to oﬃcial government data, on average drivers in Dhaka
earn Tk450 (US$5.80) per day.33 Some of our respondents mentioned they could earn as
much as Tk800–1200 (US$10.30–15.40) a day. Many said driving a rickshaw was much
better pay than the main alternative, casual day labor as construction workers.
Licenses
The ﬁrst bicycle rickshaws appeared in Dhaka in the 1930s and the ﬁrst 100 oﬃcial licenses
were issued in 1944.34 By 1952 this number had increased to 4000. After a long period
28Roy 2009.
29Her arguments against “unregulation” prompted me to choose “non-oﬃcial” rather than “unoﬃcial.”
30Roy 2009, 83; my emphasis.
31Dhaka’s general liveability and speciﬁcally its transport system have been scrutinized by donors in recent years. For
example, both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have funded road and traﬃc projects. Many of
these eﬀorts have been geared toward reducing the number of cycle rickshaws, widely seen by planners to be detrimen-
tal to traﬃc ﬂow.
32Exchange rate at time of ﬁeldwork.
33Molla 2016.
34Gallagher 1992, 88.
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without any new licenses being issued, 14,000 new licenses were released in 1969. Finally,
in 1986, the number was increased to 86,000.35 Since then, no new oﬃcial licenses have
been issued, while the number of rickshaws has steadily increased.
In the past, alternative license systems also existed to bridge the gap between the
number of oﬃcial licenses and the number of rickshaws. Unlike today, rural union
councils36 licenses used to be the most common way to get the around the license
ceiling. Duplicates of Municipal Corporation plates have been used at least since the
1970s. Finally, as Gallagher reports, around 1978 the ﬁrst organization which he describes
as a “protection racket” sprung up and provided tokens that could be shown to the police
instead of an oﬃcial license.37 Owners and drivers resented this system and, after a cam-
paign by rickshaw unions, the system was stopped.
Four types of licenses or road permits were available at the time of this research. The
ﬁrst is the oﬃcial plate issued by the DCC (Figure 2). These are the licenses which were
issued in 1986. Oﬃcially they have to be renewed by the plate owners every year. The
owners of these plates in our survey either had a big rickshaw business or had good con-
nections with the City Corporation when the plates were ﬁrst issued. Very few of the rick-
shaw owners we interviewed had oﬃcial licenses. Buying an oﬃcial plate is expensive,
costing between Tk 12,000 and Tk 25,000 (US$150-$320), along with yearly renewal
fees. Owners of oﬃcial licenses are reluctant to sell their stock. Instead, they rent out
plates on a yearly basis for between Tk 300 (US$3.80) and Tk 600 (US$7.60) a month.
These plates protect drivers from harassment, as neither police nor mobile courts
would stop an oﬃcially certiﬁed rickshaw, except on VIP roads.
An additional beneﬁt of owning an oﬃcial plate was the potential to make illegal dupli-
cates. According to respondents, there was at least one duplicate for each oﬃcial plate,
Figure 2. Rickshaw with city corporation permit, CREDIT: Aynul Islam, used by permission.
3590,000 according to Gallagher 1992, 93.
36Union Councils are the smallest rural administrative and local government unit in Bangladesh.
37Ibid., 92.
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while for some as many as ﬁve duplicates existed. The actual facts were hard to ascertain,
as most rickshaw owners said their DCC plates were non-duplicates. Those willing to
discuss duplicates indicated the rental price was around Tk100 (US$1.30) a month.
A third type of oﬃcial plate was issued by rural union councils. These were used in two
of our research locations, Uttara and Demra. Union council plates were simple to acquire.
A person went to their local council oﬃce to register his rickshaw. These plates were cheap,
with an annual fee of between Tk200 (US$2.60) and Tk400 (US$5.20). While oﬃcially
these were not allowed on DCC territory, proximity to these rural unions allowed
drivers to argue, when questioned by traﬃc police, that they were just dropping oﬀ pas-
sengers in Dhaka. In Uttara almost all rickshaws had union council plates. Moreover,
given the large distance between Uttara and Dhaka proper (ﬁve kilometers), few rickshaws
traveled outside of Uttara. In Demra, union council plates were combined with other
types. While the former worked within Demra and nearby areas, when driving to other
parts of Dhaka their authority and thus utility declined.
Finally, there were various non-oﬃcial plates (see Figure 3). Non-oﬃcial license provi-
ders often mentioned by our respondents included the Bangladesh Muktiyoddha Somon-
noy Parishad (Bangladesh Freedom Fighters Coordination Committee), Bangladesh
Muktiyoddha Sangram Samiti (Bangladesh Freedom Fighters Movement Association),
Insur Ali, Sangram, Bangladesh Rickshaw Van Sramik (workers) League, and Malik
Samiti (Owner Association). Other organizations and associations had existed in the
past, but were now no longer active at the time of this study. While their territories over-
lapped, some of these organizations were more dominant in certain locations (see below).
Some associations were known under diﬀerent names in diﬀerent locations.
Figure 3. Rickshaw with Muktiyoddha permit. CREDIT: Aynul Islam, used by permission.
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While prices varied substantially between diﬀerent parts of Dhaka, these unoﬃcial
plates were cheaper than the oﬃcial Dhaka plates. They cost between Tk50 (US$0.60)
and Tk200 (US$2.60), and usually were valid for three to six months, after which they
had to be renewed. Renewal was crucial as traﬃc police regularly stopped rickshaws
with lapsed plates. Prices were variable and depended on the bargaining position of the
rickshaw owner and the availability of alternative license systems. Big rickshaw owners
went to the oﬃces of the organizations themselves to arrange plates, but most relied on
local dalals (brokers)38 who delivered the plates in return for a fee. These dalals had
good contacts with the leaders of the organizations and could be considered their de
facto agents. As mentioned above, some plates were dominant in particular areas of
Dhaka. While most respondents did not report any problems in using these non-oﬃcial
plates, some reported that more localized plates could give minor problems when
driving far from the home turf of the issuing organization or in places where its leadership
was less known. The only danger when using non-city corporation plates was mobile
courts.39 These authorities typically would impound all rickshaws using non-DCC
plates. However, the lack of reporting of this practice might indicate its rare nature.40
Spatial variation
In our diﬀerent case study areas, diﬀerent licenses dominated. In some cases, these licenses
were not even mentioned by respondents in other parts of the city. Insur Ali licenses, while
mentioned in areas like Mohammadpur and Badda, were mostly used by rickshaw drivers
in Kamrangichar. The Bangladesh Rickshaw Van Sramik League and the Malik Samiti
licenses were mostly used in Badda. All ﬁeld sites had Muktiyoddha organizations provid-
ing licenses. While the Bangladesh Muktiyoddha Somonnoy Parishad had a presence in
almost all locations, some branches were highly localized. In Mohammadpur, the Bangla-
desh Muktiyoddha Dhaka Mahanagar Somonnoy Parishad (Bangladesh Freedom Fighters
Dhaka City Coordination Committee) oﬀered a license that promised protection only in
Mohammadpur and its close vicinity. As one rickshaw owner explained:
In this area [Mohammadpur] Muktiyoddha [Bangladesh Muktiyoddha Dhaka Mahanagar
Somonnoy Parishad] is dominating. The rule is that this card cannot go outside of Moham-
madpur. But the rules are not followed. Now drivers go everywhere according to their wish.
While this respondent felt safe using this license, others were less sure. Some respondents
noted that Insur Ali plates were most useful in Kamrangichar and in nearby Old Dhaka.
As the non-ofﬁcial licenses were closely tied to individuals or coalitions of local political
leaders, often drawing upon the support of a speciﬁc government minister or member of
parliament (MP), their validity was also dependent on the strength of this individual or
MP. “Some cards are very powerful and some are less powerful,” explained one driver.
“The power depends on the strength of the organization or the person providing the
card.” While the main Muktiyoddha organizations had sufﬁcient political support that
38As in many South Asian countries, brokers in Bangladesh play a central role in connecting citizens to the state. The term
dalal refers to these brokers, but has a negative connotation.
39These were introduced in 2009 to provide limited judicial powers to administrative oﬃcers. They are supposed to provide
instant legal actions against a number of oﬀences.
40According to two infromants, license providers would sometimes inform their clients about where mobile courts would
be located.
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their licenses could be used everywhere, there seemed to be a general understanding that,
as one rickshaw owner explained, “Some unofﬁcial licenses do not ensure its accessibility
in the whole of Dhaka city, whereas city corporation licenses have no restrictions in this
matter.” At the same time, and as the above quote shows, in most cases, the Awami League
government was seen as allowing all these licenses to be use, and only a minority of
respondents discussed spatial restrictions.
The mimicry of the oﬃcial license
Oﬃcial plates are a materialization of the state and a sign of its authority.41 The license
consists of an action of the state (“a practical language of governance”): by oﬀering a
license, the state allows for a certain activity to take place, and for this to be regulated
by the state. At the same time, the license’s material form (the license itself) refers to
the state’s symbolic languages of authority; it is a seal of approval aﬃxed on the back of
the rickshaw (see ﬁgure 2).
Both in their “practical language of governance” and in their “symbolic language of
authority”42 the non-oﬃcial licenses mimic the oﬃcial ones. The non-oﬃcial rickshaw
licenses in their material form reﬂect the symbolic authority of the oﬃcial city corporation
plates. The non-oﬃcial licenses mimic the oﬃcial permit’s authorizing capacity. They also
mimic the state sign itself. While visually distinct, the non-oﬃcial plates replicate the
overall design of the oﬃcial license. Both have a rickshaw in the top corner, the name
of the authorizing organization centered below, and a symbol referring to the issuing
organization and the license number at the bottom. They are the same size and are
attached in the same place at the back of rickshaws. In this sense, the oﬃcial license
clearly operates as a “master code” referred to by the non-oﬃcial licenses.43
The non-oﬃcial licenses do not only copy the form of the oﬃcial plates, they refer to
state legality itself. This reference to state legality enhances their legitimacy. Quite often,
the users of these non-oﬃcial plates we interviewed would refer to their license as legal.
One rickshaw owner argued:
They have written in the plate that it is a government permitted card. If you check one plate
then you will understand. They have taken a writ from the high court. In the plate you will see
the writ petition number, date of case, serial number, direction from the high court.
This claim of legality was precarious, given that no judgment had been given at the time of
this interview. The reference to being “government permitted” is equally ambiguous. As I
argue below, such executive permission can only be understood in connection to the
working of the party-state. Finally, unofﬁcial permits clearly referred to the law in
stating that driving on VIP roads was not allowed, as per ofﬁcial regulations.
While the symbolic mimicry of the state helps to maintain its legitimacy, more crucial
for the drivers and owners was that in their practical daily lives the non-oﬃcial licenses
functioned as well as oﬃcial ones. They regulated which rickshaws could operate
where. Respondents, while of course aware that diﬀerent types of licenses existed and
that those issued by the City Corporation were oﬃcial, did not see much diﬀerence in
41Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 8.
42Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 5.
43Mbembe 2001, 103.
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practice. Many respondents echoed a driver who stated, “We usually take a license from
the Bangladesh Muktiyoddha Somonnoy Parishad. It works like a city corporation
license.” The perceived legality of non-oﬃcial licenses was repeatedly justiﬁed by respon-
dents who noted that traﬃc police allowed the practice. One driver in Badda asserted, “If
any rickshaw has this plate [from the Muktiyoddha Parishad] the traﬃc sergeant cannot
take this rickshaw.” Some even thought the Muktiyoddha license was more practical than
an oﬃcial one. A garage owner in Kamrangichar explained:
Dhaka city plates create more problems in VIP roads. If the police capture rickshaws with a
Dhaka city plate in the VIP roads, they do not give back the rickshaw easily. But with a Muk-
tiyoddha plate, they let them go easily.
Police ofﬁcials were aware that an ofﬁcial license was worth more than the rickshaw. Non-
ofﬁcial plates, only worth a few hundred taka and expiring after a few months, did not add
any value to the rickshaw, allowing it to be released easier.
It could be argued that the associations issuing these licenses take on a form of state-
ness, acting like successful public authorities licensing rickshaws. Because the police did
not stop these rickshaws, and even enforced the renewal of non-oﬃcial licenses, these
appear to be fundamentally hybrid. However, such an analysis disregards the nature of
the Bangladesh state as well as the formation of the licensing associations involved.
The Bangladesh party-state
The operation of the Bangladesh state necessitates a closer look at the twilight or hybrid
character of the non-oﬃcial license system. Borrowing from the work of Aristide Zolberg
on the workings of West-African single-party regimes, I describe the Bangladesh state as a
party-state.44 In a party-state there is a strong overlap between the party and the state, and
state resources are used to further party goals. Positions within the state apparatus are used
to reward loyal party cadres. As such, the party is the key organizing vehicle: it connects
the formal operation of the state to the objectives and practices of the political party in
power. Zolberg particularly highlights the role of party wings. In a party-state, these
have a central role, not only furthering the party’s agenda, but ensuring social control
and regulating particular (economic) sectors of society.
These branches include those that have fairly direct linkages to the political party in
power (such as student and youth organizations, or farmer and trade unions), but also
a host of associations and committees, in which party aﬃliation is crucial for gaining
power and authority. The Bangladesh state has allowed a number of these auxiliary organ-
izations to regulate speciﬁc sectors of society and the economy, but also controls them pol-
itically. For example, student organizations aim to dominate campuses, and youth
organizations are allowed to organize markets and extract taxes. Market, transport, and
industry committees, dominated by members of the party-in-power, regulate these
speciﬁc sectors. Through connections with ministers and MPs, these groups are able to
regulate and govern. As such, they cannot operate without clear state sanction. They
are part of the state’s arsenal to manage the population and the economy, sometimes pro-
viding a means of overcoming certain policy contradictions. This context is crucial to
44Zolberg 1966. For the related notion of “partyarchy,” see Hasan 2006, 20.
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understand why the non-oﬃcial rickshaw license system an internal part of the party-
state, not an external force.
This integration started during the formation of a party-state political organization under
the Awami League of Mujibur Rahman (in power, 1972–1975). Under his rule, the logic of
the party-state was not yet embedded or hegemonic. He used the Awami League party to
actively bind societal groups to his nascent state. Patronage was used by the AL to integrate
them. A similar logic was followed under Ziaur Rahman (in power 1978–1982) after the for-
mation of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Hussain Mohammad Ershad (in
power 1986–1991) after the formation of the Jatiya Party. By the time of democratic elec-
tions in 1991, this form of rule had become consolidated.
License mimicry as a party-state practice
The operation of the diﬀerent associations and their connections to the ruling party are
central to understanding the integration of the non-oﬃcial license business and the
party-state. While not all respondents knew, or were willing to share the details of, how
exactly the associations were connected, for all it was very clear that these groups
worked in close collaboration with the ruling party, and that everybody understood that
they only acted “as if” they were outsiders. A Mohammadpur rickshaw owner said:
The card providing organization has a connection to the government, for instance through a
minister’s relative or his personal secretary; or his junior leaders are involved. Through this
organization, they are getting crore-crore taka.45 Usually, they get tender from the govern-
ment for introducing this card on the market for a year.
Another respondent argued, “The strength [of the non-ofﬁcial licenses] is that these
organizations are being operated under the ruling party, or, in other words, that these
organizations are different wings of the ruling party.” The associations that operate
these license businesses form part of the cadre base of the ruling party, with individual
ministers and MPs providing speciﬁc shelter to these operations. They supply manpower
(for instance, for processions or election duty) and help to sustain the party’s network; in
return they are allowed a part of the rickshaw business.
Non-oﬃcial license associations and party-state integration
The role of Insur Ali in the non-oﬃcial permit business is an example of how this system
operates. Ali was at the time of this research the general secretary of the Jatiya Rickshaw
Van Sramik League, a part of the AL trade union, Bangladesh Sramik League. In an inter-
view with the New Nation, a Bangladesh newspaper, Ali stated that 35,000 rickshaws oper-
ated under his organization.46 In our interviews, Insur Ali also makes frequent appearances,
whether as a personal provider of rickshaw licenses, or in the form of Sramik League or
Sangram licenses. As the general secretary of the ruling party’s trade union, he was directly
integrated into the network of the party-state. Because of this, he was considered an impor-
tant political leader in Kamrangichar, where he lived. His direct link came through a well-
known Awami League politician and minister, as explained by a rickshaw owner:
45One crore equals 10 million.
46New Nation 2015.
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You go to the AL party oﬃce. You will see Insur Ali there. A black-colored man. His name is
Insur Ali. He is younger than me. Maya Chowdhury has given him the opportunity.
The reference to the AL party ofﬁce is quite telling. When asked where someone could
arrange a license, other respondents directly named Insur Ali and his ofﬁce on Banga-
bandhu Avenue in Dhaka (also the site of the Awami League central ofﬁce). Ali’s openness
about his connection to the ruling party and the way he is openly patronized demonstrates
that his non-ofﬁcial license business does not operate in the shadows, but is clearly inte-
grated into the working of the ruling party and hence the state.
A second type of organization and arguably the most powerful in the non-oﬃcial
permit business are the freedom ﬁghters associations. Given Bangladesh’s fairly recent
war of independence (1971), freedom ﬁghters are venerated in society. Freedom ﬁghters
(and their families) have access to preferential jobs, loans, and educational opportunities
through a thirty percent quota system. This preferential access extends to the license
sector, providing a veneer of legality to the non-oﬃcial license system.
Some respondents referred to the background of the freedom ﬁghters in allowing for
their license business: “The proﬁt which is earned is given to the welfare of the freedom
ﬁghters,” said one. Another respondent commented: “This card is given by the govern-
ment to help the freedom ﬁghters who are not able to work.” Yet others noted these associ-
ations’ strong contacts with the government. The freedom ﬁghter associations are
particularly associated with the AL, which took the lead in the independence movement.
Those involved in the organization are well-known AL leaders, having been involved in
AL politics since Bangladesh independence, as noted by one Muktiyoddha plate owner:
You may know [famous leader of one of the Mukhti Bahini groups]. He has a relation to the
Prime Minister. He was a good friend of Sheikh Shaheb [Mujibur Rahman]. He has some
people. They call a meeting. In this meeting, they discuss the full process. He attends the
meeting. They discuss the rate of the plate, how to provide the plate, how to take money,
how to maintain all the procedures.
These associations organize and participate in ruling party programs and provide man-
power and organizational power. They speciﬁcally highlight the role of the AL in bringing
independence, and downplay the role of the founder of the rival BNP, Ziaur Rahman, in
the independence struggle. Like Insur Ali, they offer a network in different parts of the city,
which can be drawn upon by political leaders. Fully integrated into the working of the
ruling party, they in return are allowed to regulate part of the rickshaw trade and proﬁt
from this.
Police, administration, government
Police cooperation amounted to more than simple indiﬀerence to non-oﬃcial licenses.
The police played an active role in the enforcement of non-oﬃcial rickshaw plates. To
have an up-to-date license was considered crucial. The importance of keeping non-
oﬃcial plates up-to-date, to avoid having a rickshaw impounded by the police, shows
the close integration of state oﬃcials into the non-oﬃcial license business. They are not
simply bystanders, but actively work in favor of those supplying non-oﬃcial licenses.
They did not enforce the use of oﬃcial DCC licenses by searching for non-oﬃcial
plates. Instead, they looked for expired non-oﬃcial licenses.
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This police cooperation, and the way it is managed by political leaders and administra-
tors, should not be taken at face value. Traﬃc police have a very real stake in allowing rick-
shaw drivers with non-oﬃcial licenses to go about their business unharmed. All license-
giving organizations provide a cut of their proﬁts to the police force, at all levels of oper-
ation. While this of course is clearly corruption, again in the logic of the party-state, this
corruption plays a facilitating role. As mentioned, loyal party cadres are rewarded with
state positions. A position with the traﬃc police is one way party cadres are rewarded.47
Again, the close integration between party leadership, administration (including police),
and auxiliary organizations, like trade unions or freedom ﬁghters associations, allows
for the smooth operation of the license system.
While individual beneﬁts accruing to the license associations and the traﬃc police
lubricate the non-oﬃcial license system, the government has clear incentives to not
further regulate the trade. To do so, they would have two choices. The ﬁrst would be to
limit the actual number of rickshaws operating on the streets to the 86,000 oﬃcial
plates already issued. The second would be to issue additional licenses, regularizing the
current situation and, by formal bureaucratic procedure, eliminating all non-oﬃcial
licenses. The ﬁrst option is highly unfeasible. One rickshaw, as it is rented out at least
twice, and often three times a day, helps to provide a livelihood for two or three families.
Even using the low estimate of 400,000 rickshaws on the streets of Dhaka, the industry
supports between 800,000 and 1.2 million workers. This does not include the garage per-
sonal, bicycle repairmen, restaurant staﬀ, and others who make a living from the rickshaw
business. From a governance and economic perspective, with seasonal migration into
Dhaka showing no signs of abating, these jobs are quite crucial to maintain.
The latter option, regularizing the non-oﬃcial sector, is also not feasible. The Bangla-
desh government has repeatedly committed to reducing traﬃc congestion in Dhaka.48
Rickshaws (and other small transport vehicles like motorized three-wheelers, or CNGs)
do not ﬁt into these plans and have been destined to disappear by planners.49 With the
support of the World Bank, all small transport vehicles have been banned from so-called
VIP roads – a ban, as all our respondents agreed, which was heavily policed – and a full
amnesty would mean serious loss of face for the government.50 Some respondents were
quite aware of this. As one explained:
The authorities cannot give permission to increase the number of city corporation plates,
because more rickshaws means an increase in traﬃc jams. So the government gave per-
mission to some organizations to issue the rickshaw licenses.
The origins of the non-ofﬁcial licenses were put in this context by an active member of the
Muktiyoddha federation in Badda:
As the number of licenses was very insuﬃcient some organizations created pressure to issue
new licenses. But the government wanted to remove the additional rickshaws from Dhaka
city. So they did not give permission [to issue new licenses]. Then the organizations
created pressure from time to time and the authorities became bound to give permission
unoﬃcially.
47See the International Crisis Group 2009.
48For an overview see Uddin Hasan 2013, 141–149.
49For a critique, see Bari and Efroymson 2005.
50The World Bank 2013. While the World Bank initially aimed to reduce the number of rickshaws in Dhaka, it has reassessed
this approach, for reasons of environmental sustainability, see Ke 2014.
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For the AL government, allowing the non-ofﬁcial sector to continue maintains jobs
for a poor and often mobile population. In addition, the government does not
lose face or contradict its public commitment to resolve Dhaka’s trafﬁc congestion
by reducing the number of small passenger vehicles, including rickshaws. Finally,
this provides opportunities for party-state patronage to AL supporters. It is a political
solution to the problem of rickshaw licenses, rather than a bureaucratic one, which
would entail either issuing more licenses or enforcing the reduction of rickshaws
plying the streets.
Regime change
This political solution, using party associations to regulate the rickshaw sector rather
than a bureaucratic one involving the administration and the police, has become more
pronounced during the most recent Awami League administration (since 2008 until
now), according to respondents. While our material does not allow a full analysis of
the historical evolution of the rickshaw trade since the return to democracy in 1991, it
is important to highlight some of the variations during the BNP period, as this illustrates
party-state rule and highlights clear policy diﬀerences between the two parties. While the
BNP also used party wings while in power, their focus was more clearly on bureaucratic
consolidation. This is in line with historical diﬀerences between the Awami League and
BNP. Under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (in power 1972–1975), the Awami League viewed
the bureaucracy and its privileges as a relic of the Pakistan period, so aimed to establish
“political control over the bureaucracy,” trying to circumvent the bureaucracy by
working through loyal party cadres.51 In contrast, Ziaur Rahman (in power 1975–
1981), and the BNP he founded, supported bureaucrats and restored many of the privi-
leges they had lost during the Awami League period.52 This historical preference for the
bureaucracy was also evident in the rickshaw sector.
The non-oﬃcial license business follows the party-state model. In line with what
happens on Bangladesh university campuses, on market committees, and in business
associations, the supporters of the party-in-power take control after a change of govern-
ment. Given their close association and even integration into the Awami League, the
license organizations at the time of this research were mostly not operational during
the BNP period. A garage manager in Mohammadpur explained, “The Muktiyoddha
plate was introduced during this AL government. These plates were not available under
the previous government.” In other cases, the organization had remained the same but
its leadership had changed. “When AL is in power, the members of the Malik Samiti
are all AL supporters,” a Badda mechanic said, “when the government changes, the
members change.” During the BNP period, the most popular plate was the Mahtab
license, according to one respondent. Others were certain that a change in party in
power would again change the set-up of the license sector. According to a rickshaw
owner in Kamrangichar, “When BNP comes to power they will chase the present
organizations.”
51Ahmed 1991, 84.
52Hossain 1988, 43.
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While non-oﬃcial licenses had been available when the BNP was in power between
2001 and 2006, respondents who discussed this issue agreed that these licenses had not
been as good as the current ones, as illustrated in this quote by a garage manager:
During the BNP period there were such plates which worked like the city corporation license.
But by using these cards we did not feel secure. That is why we mainly operated these rick-
shaws in the evening or in the very early morning.
The BNP government did not support the non-ofﬁcial licenses. Faced with the same limits
on ofﬁcial licenses, most garage owners “made duplicate plates from the original licenses,”
according to one mechanic.
Certainly, the police played a much more active role during BNP rule. Without the
backing of the BNP party-state, the non-oﬃcial licenses did not have police support.
The decision by the BNP government to encourage the police to crack down on the rick-
shaw sector did not reduce the number of rickshaws in Dhaka. Rather, it gave traﬃc police
new opportunities to supplement their salaries by seizing rickshaws and requiring drivers
and owners to pay ﬁnes.
Party-state morality
Given the ubiquity of non-oﬃcial licenses in Dhaka, why does anyone use a more expens-
ive city corporation license? Most of the rickshaw owners and pullers interviewed for this
study agreed that non-oﬃcial licenses were much cheaper and oﬀered smooth operation
on the street. This did not mean they fully equated them with oﬃcial plates. The morality
of non-oﬃcial licenses was repeatedly challenged. While respondents commented that this
was the way things worked in Bangladesh, the oﬃcial license remained imbued with a
special aura. As one owner commented, “I am using the original Dhaka city plates on
all of my rickshaws because with these plates, our drivers can drive their rickshaws
freely and raise their heads proudly in the street.” Another rickshaw owner stated: “The
rickshaws which have the City Corporation license are the kings of the road.”
The morality of the party-state and its role in the business of non-oﬃcial licenses
was most eloquently stated by one Kamrangichar rickshaw owner, discussing the role
of the administration in the non-oﬃcial license business: “In bad work there are a
hundred people, but in good work, there is only one active in society.” In other words,
if you have the backing of powerful persons, morality is no longer important. As
another driver stated, “In Bangladesh everything is possible. Taka and power can make
everything possible.” Using the oﬃcial licenses was equated with being a good or
morally upright person. A garage manager, talking about one owner, praised him: “Our
Mahajan is a good and exceptional person. He does not want to be the tabedari [depen-
dent, client] of others. That is why he uses the Dhaka city plate.” Another garage owner,
who considered himself to be an honest person and who had invested in oﬃcial plates,
complained:
Any person with a few thousand taka can become a garage owner. They buy ﬁve or six rick-
shaws and then take an unoﬃcial plate. Nobody is saying anything to them. Not the govern-
ment, not the administration. Formerly, everybody who wanted to own a garage feared that it
was mandatory to take the Dhaka city plate. But now they are using these unoﬃcial plates
without hesitation.
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He saw this as the breakdown of the rickshaw sector, pushing honest rickshaw owners out of
business. Many rickshaw owners used non-ofﬁcial licenses because there were no ofﬁcial
ones available. With the police allowing non-ofﬁcial licenses and even supporting the
business, rickshaw owners had few options. Yet, in line with the lack of moral ground of
the non-ofﬁcial rickshaws, their use was not preferred: the non-ofﬁcial licenses did not
trump the ofﬁcial ones. As one owner stated, “if the government would provide new licenses
from the city corporation, the [Malik] Samiti would lose its authority to provide licenses.”
In Demra and Uttara, licenses from union councils were available and could be used to
some extent. In Demra the licenses were mostly used by drivers operating within Demra
itself and its vicinity. Yet in Uttara they could be used in almost all areas. What these
examples show is that if an oﬃcial license is available, the non-oﬃcial licenses are much
less popular. In Demra, non-oﬃcial licenses, which drivers used when they peddled a cus-
tomer to other parts of Dhaka, were markedly cheaper than they were in areas where there
were few other options. Party-state regulation has given rise to closely integrated non-oﬃcial
license systems. Yet, while those owning, repairing, or driving rickshaws were happy to use
these non-oﬃcial licenses, they preferred a morally superior oﬃcial license.
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that while the literature on hybrid or twilight institutions has
highlighted the complexity of and relations between state and non-state forms of regu-
lation, researchers should try to understand what kind of states are operating in contexts
where regulation is not only the domain of the state. As the case of non-oﬃcial rickshaw
licenses in Dhaka shows, this type of regulation does not originate outside the state. Using
the concept of the party-state, I argue that non-oﬃcial rickshaw licenses in fact are a part
of state regulation and the organizations issuing them are closely integrated into the oper-
ation of the Bangladesh party-state. As such, while non-oﬃcial licenses may appear to
mimic the language of the state this mimicry is part of the operation of the state itself.
Members of the party-state, including the leadership of the issuing organizations and pol-
itical party leaders, the administration, and police enforce compliance with the non-oﬃcial
rickshaw license business, with all beneﬁtting from its operation. While those in the rick-
shaw business are quite happy with the availability at a reduced cost of these non-oﬃcial
licenses – given that most in the business believe these are as eﬀective as the oﬃcial ones –
the morality of the non-oﬃcial license trade is still questioned. If more oﬃcial rickshaw
licenses were available there is a good chance that owners and drivers alike would
prefer these. Certainly for drivers, this would increase the security of their livelihood, dis-
regarding a change of party in power. It remains to be seen whether the long-lived fallacy
of the demise of the rickshaw trade in Dhaka will change. However, if new forms of regu-
lation fail to take into account the workings of the party-state and the associate logics of
resource allocation and accumulation, these are bound to fail.
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